Analysis on the Optimal Default Boundaries where a Firm's Cross-ownership of Debts and Equities is Present (Financial Modeling and Analysis) by 鈴木, 輝好 & 八木, 恭子
Title
Analysis on the Optimal Default Boundaries where a Firm's
Cross-ownership of Debts and Equities is Present (Financial
Modeling and Analysis)
Author(s)鈴木, 輝好; 八木, 恭子




Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University
Analysis on the Optimal Default Boundaries where
a Firm's Cross-ownership of Debts and Equities is Present1
Teruyoshi Suzuki
Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration
Hokkaido University
Kyoko Yagi
Faculty of Systems Science and Technology
Akita Prefectural University
1 Introduction
Blundel-Wingnall (2011) reported that foreign banks' cross-border exposure to sovereign debt of
Italy, France and Spain is large and heavily concentrated within EU banks. They also reported
that a similar observation can be seen with respect to the cross-border exposure between banks.
Therefore we need to consider the cross-holding structures of debts when we evaluate the credit
risk of EU countries and banks in EU.
There are several papers for the pricing model under cross-holding of securities. Suzuki
(2002) showed a credit pricing model by extending Merton's structural model under rms' cross-
holdings of debts and equities within $n$ rms. Fischer (2014) generalized Suzuki(2002) with bond
seniority structures and derivatives. However there has been no study that attempted to extend
these to an endogenous default model such as Black and Cox (1976) and Leland (1996). In this
study, we will extend the structural model in which a rm chooses default to maximize their
equity value to that with cross-holdings of securities. The purpose of this paper is to analyze
the default decision of rms and the optimal default boundaries when two rms establish cross-
holdings of debts and equities.
2 Debt, Equity and Financial Asset
2.1 Basic Assumption
We consider EBIT (earnings before interest and tax) based model proposed by Goldstein, Ju
and Leland (2001). We suppose two rms, namely rm $i$ and rm $j$ that produces payout ows
specied by
$\frac{dD_{k}(t)}{D_{k}(t)}=\mu_{k}^{P}dt+\sigma_{k}dW_{k}^{P}(t) , k=i, j$ (1)
under phicial measure $\mathcal{P}$ where $\mu_{k}^{P},$ $\sigma_{k}$ are constants and where $W_{i}^{P}(t)$ and $W_{j}^{P}(t)$ are strandard
Brownian motion with an instantaneous covariance $Cov(dW_{i}^{P}, dW_{j}^{P})=\rho dt.$
Throughout our analysis, we suppose the risk-free rate $r$ is constant. As in Goldstein, Ju
and Leland (2001), the value of claim to the entire payout cash ow is given by
$Z_{k}(t)= \frac{D_{k}(t)}{r-\mu_{k}}, k=i, j$ (2)
under risk neutral measure $\mathcal{Q}$ assuming some economic conditions about an agent's risk aversion.
Then we can show that $D_{i}(t)$ , $D_{j}(t)$ follow
$\frac{dD_{k}(t)}{D_{k}(t)}=\mu_{k}dt+\sigma_{k}dW_{k}(t) , k=i, j$ , (3)
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where $\mu_{k}$ are risk adjusted drifts and where $W_{i}(t)$ and $W_{j}(t)$ are standard Brownian motion
under $\mathcal{Q}$ with instantaneous covariance $Cov(dW_{i}, dW_{j})=\rho dt$ . We call the claims to entire
EBITs ows rms' business assets to distinguish the rms' nancial assets because we will
suppose rms can hold debts and equities as their nancial assets.
Since $Z_{k}(t)$ follows the same process with $D_{k}(t)$ and risk adjusted drift $\mu_{k}$ satises (2),
business assets follow
$\frac{dZ_{k}(t)}{Z_{k}(t)}=(r-\frac{D_{k}(t)}{Z_{k}(t)})dt+\sigma_{k}dW_{k}(t), k=i, j$ (4)
under $\mathcal{Q}$ . Hereafter we suppose $Z_{i}(t)$ and $Z_{j}(t)$ are the state variables for the values of the
securities issued by rm $i$ and rm $j.$
2.2 Levered Firm Holding Consol Bond
We begin by considering rms that hold a riskless consol bond as their nancial asset and issue
a corporate consol bond. Throughout this paper, we ignore corporate tax to simplify the rm's
capital structure. We denote the random time of default of rm $k=i,$ $j$ by $\tau_{k}$ . Assume that rm
$k$ holds a consol bond with coupon $c$ . Assume also that the stock holder must pay a constant
coupon payment $c_{k}$ to debt holders by issuing new stock and can get the EBIT ow as stock
holders and coupon ow from the holding consol bond as long as the rm is solvent. Since the
stationarity of the payos of the debts and equities implies that the values of securities issued
by rm $k$ will be time-independent, the value of equity issued by rm $k$ can be given by
$q_{k}^{s}(Z_{k}(0))=E^{Q}[ \int_{0}^{\tau_{k}}e^{-rt}(c-c_{k})dt+\int_{0}^{\tau_{k}}e^{-rt}D_{k}(t)dt], k=i, j$ . (5)
We assume further that at the time of default, debt holders can get the remaining business
assets reduced by proportional default cost $\delta_{k},$ $(k=i, j)$ while the remaining nancial assets are
assumed to be safe. Thus the value of debt is equal to
$q_{k}^{d}(Z_{k}(0))=E^{Q}[ \int_{0}^{\tau_{k}}e^{-rt}c_{k}dt+e^{-r\tau_{k}}((1-\delta_{k})Z_{k}(\tau_{k})+\frac{c}{r})], k=i, j$ . (6)
Here, (5) and (6) can be given by the closed form expression as follows,
Lemma 1 Let $q_{k}^{d}(Z_{k};c)$ , $q_{k}^{s}(Z_{k};c)$ , $(k=i, j)$ denote the values of debts and equities when each
rm $k$ holds a consol bond with coupon amount $c$ as their nancial asset. Assume $c_{k}>c$ then
$q_{k}^{d},$
$q_{k}^{s}$ are equal to:
$q_{k}^{d}(Z_{k};c) = \frac{c_{k}'}{r}\{1-(\frac{Z_{k}}{b_{k}})^{\gamma_{k}}\}+(1-\delta_{k})b_{k}(\frac{Z_{k}}{b_{k}})^{\gamma_{k}}$ (7)
$q_{k}^{s}(Z_{k};c) = Z_{k}- \frac{c_{k}'}{r}-(b_{k}-\frac{c_{k}'}{r})(\frac{Z_{k}}{b_{k}})^{\gamma_{k}}$ (8)
where
$b_{k}= \frac{\gamma_{k}}{\gamma_{k}-1}\frac{c_{k}'}{r}, c_{k}'=c_{k}-c$ , (9)
and where
$\gamma_{k}=\frac{1}{2}-\frac{\mu_{k}}{\sigma_{k}^{2}}-\sqrt{(\frac{1}{2}-\frac{\mu_{k}}{\sigma_{k}^{2}})^{2}+\frac{2r}{\sigma_{k}^{2}}}<0, k=i, j$ . (10)
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We omit the proof because it is straightforward.
Remark 1 The debts and equities prices and the optimal default thresholds can be written by
the value of \net nancial debt $c_{k}'/r.$
Remark 2 If $Z_{k}>b_{k},$ $(k=i,j)$ then the value of debts $q_{k}^{d}(Z_{k};c)$ and equities $q_{k}^{s}(Z_{k};c)$ are
increasing junction of the coupon amount of consol bond $c$ . This can be assured from the value
of $\partial q_{k}^{s}(Z_{k};c)/\partial c$ and $\partial q_{k}^{d}(Z_{k};c)/\partial c.$
2.3 Cash ow under Cross-holding of debts and equities
Now suppose that both rm $i$ and $j$ owns debts and equities in each other. Let $\pi_{ij}^{d},$ $\pi_{ij}^{s}\in[0$ , 1$]$
denote the proportions of debt and equity issued by rm $j$ and held by rm $i$ . Let $\pi_{ji}^{d},$ $\pi_{ji}^{s}\in[0$ , 1$]$
denote the proportions of debt and equity issued by rm $i$ and held by rm $j$ . Here any securities
issued by rm $i$ and $j$ will be time-independent because both issued debt and holding debt are
consol bonds. Therefore, we denote $p_{i}^{d}(Z_{i}, Z_{j}),p_{j}^{d}(Z_{i}, Z_{j})$ the value of debts issued by rm $i,$ $j.$
We denote also by $p_{i}^{s}(Z_{i}, Z_{j}),p_{j}^{s}(Z_{i}, Z_{j})$ the value of equities issued by rms $i,$ $j$ . To understand
the cross-holding structures, we state the values of securities from a cash ow standpoint.
First, the cash ow to the equity holder of rm $i$ is given by the sum of following: (i) payment
of coupon to their debt holders and receiving a dividend on the issued equity until the time of
rm $i$ 's default. (ii) receiving a coupon from holding debt issued by rm $j$ until either rm $i$
defaults or rm $j$ defaults and the remaining value of debt at the time of default of rm $j$ . (iii)
payment of coupon to debt holders of rm $j$ as the equity holder of rm $j$ 's equity and receiving
dividend from rm $j$ 's equity until either rm $i$ defaults or rm $j$ defaults. Hence, risk-neutral
expectation of cash ow to equity holders of rm $i$ at time $0$ is given by
$p_{i}^{s}(Z_{i}(0), Z_{j}(0)) = E[- \int_{0}^{\tau_{i}}e^{-rt}c_{i}dt+\int_{0}^{\tau_{i}}e^{-rt}D_{i}(t)dt$
$+ \int_{0}^{\tau_{i}\Lambda\tau_{j}}e^{-rt}\pi_{ij}^{d}c_{j}dt+1_{\tau_{j}<\tau_{i}}\{e^{-r\tau_{j}}\pi_{ij}^{d}p_{j}^{d}(Z_{i}(\tau_{j}), Z_{j}(\tau_{j}))\}$
$- \int_{0}^{\tau_{i}\wedge\tau_{j}}e^{-rt}\pi_{ij}^{s}c_{j}dt+\int_{0}^{\tau_{i}\wedge\tau_{j}}e^{-rt}\pi_{ij}^{s}D_{j}(t)dt]$ , (11)
where $\tau_{i}\wedge\tau_{j}$ denotes the minimum of $\tau_{i}$ and $\tau_{j}$ , and where $D_{k}(t)=(r-\mu_{k})Z_{k}(t)$ , $k=i,$ $j$ from
(2).
Second, a cash ow to the debt holder of rm $i$ is given by the sum of followings: (i) receiving
a coupon payment until the rm $i$ 's default and remaining business assets of rm $i$ at the time
of rm $i$ 's default, (ii) the value of rm $j$ 's debt and equity at the time of rm $j$ 's default. Thus
the value of debt issued by rm $i$ is expressed by
$p_{i}^{d}(Z_{i}(0), Z_{j}(0))=E^{Q}[ \int_{0}^{\mathcal{T}_{i}}e^{-rt}c_{i}dt+(1-\delta_{i})e^{-r\tau_{i}}Z_{i}(\tau_{i})$
$+1_{\tau_{i}<\tau_{j}}\{e^{-r\tau i}\pi_{ij}^{d}p_{j}^{d}(Z_{i}(\tau_{i}), Z_{j}(\tau_{i}))\}+1_{\tau_{l}<\tau_{j}}\{e^{-r\tau i}\pi_{ij}^{s}p_{j}^{s}(Z_{i}(\tau_{i}), Z_{j}(\tau_{i}))\}].$
(12)
Note that rm $j$ 's equity value $p_{j}^{s}(Z_{i}(0), Z_{j}(O))$ and debt value $p_{j}^{d}(Z_{i}(0), Z_{j}(O))$ can be given
by replacing $j$ with $i$ in (11) and (12).
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2.4 Assumption of Default and Liquidation
We will set up how rms' defaults happen under the cross-holdings of securities and how to
divide the share of securities at the time of a rm's default. We suppose that simultaneous
defaults may happen between rm $i$ and rm $j$ . We assume the possible scenario of default and
the distribution of remaining assets with default costs as follows.
Suppose both rm $i$ and rm $j$ are in solvent at time O. Assume both rm $i$ and rm $j$
independently choose their default boundaries on $(Z_{i}, Z_{j})$ in the market that are frictionless and
free of informational asymmetries. Assume that rm $i$ and $j$ shall default in the following possible
ve scenarios where $(x_{ij}^{20}, y_{ij}^{20})$ , $(x_{i}^{20}, y_{i}^{20})$ , $(x_{j}^{20}, y_{j}^{20})$ , $(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})$ and $(x_{j}^{21}, y_{j}^{21})$ denote corresponding
default boundaries on $(Z_{\iota'}, Z_{j})\in R_{+}^{2}$ . These will be the only set of default sequences under the
assumption that only the equity holders can choose their rms' default and the assumption that
the equity holders' objectives are the maximization of their equity values.
First we assume the default sequence and liquidation scheme on simultaneous default.
Assumption 1 (Simultaneous Default) We assume that if $\{\tau_{i}=\tau_{j}\}$ happens, debt issued
by rm $i$ and $j$ are liquidated at the same time and holding debts issued by counter mn under
$cro\mathcal{S}S$-holdings of debts are valued as defaulted debts at liquidation. Further we assume three type
of simultaneous defaults as follows:
Case 1. $\{t=\tau_{i}=\tau_{j}\}$ happens on $(x_{ij}^{20}, y_{ij}^{20})$ . Both rm $i$ and $j$ go into default at the same time
on $(x_{ij}^{20}, y_{ij}^{20})$ . The $(x_{ij}^{20}, y_{ij}^{20})$ is the optimal boundaries for both rm $i$ and $j$ 's equity
holders.
Case 2. $\{t=\tau_{i}=\tau_{j}\}$ happens on $(x_{i}^{20}, y_{i}^{20})$ . Firm $i$ chooses going into default so as to maximize
their equity value on $(x_{i}^{20}, y_{i}^{20})$ where rm $j$ immediately chooses default because it is
too late for the maximization of nn $j$ 's equity value.
Case 3. $\{t=\tau_{j}=\tau_{i}\}$ happens on $(x_{j}^{20}, y_{j}^{20})$ . As well as above, rm $j$ chooses going into default
on $(x_{j}^{20}, y_{j}^{20})$ and it causes rm $i$ 's default. The default on $(x_{j}^{20}, y_{j}^{20})$ is not the optimal
for rm $i.$
Second we assume the default sequence and liquidation scheme on non-simultaneous default.
We assume two types of liquidation schemes as follows,
Assumption 2 (Non-simultaneous Default) We assume that if $\{\tau_{j}<\tau_{i}\}$ or $\{\tau_{i}<\tau_{j}\}$
happens, then the debt issued by the defaulting nn is liquidated and the solvent rm invests the
cash into a risk-free consol bond. Further we assume two types of non-simultaneous default as
follows:
Case 4. $\{t=\tau_{i}<\tau_{j}\}$ happens on $(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})$ . Firm $i$ chooses going into default on a boundary
where rm $j$ chooses being solvent to maximize their equity value.
Case 5. $\{t=\tau_{j}<\tau_{i}\}$ happens on $(x_{j}^{21}, y_{j}^{21})$ . In the same manner with Case 4, rm $j$ chooses
going into default on $(x_{J}^{21}, y_{j}^{21})$ while rm $i$ is solvent.
2.5 Debt Values on Default Boundaries
For the purpose of analysis on the default boundaries, we need to investigate how the value of
securities are distributed to each security holder at the time of default. First, we show the case
when simultaneous default happens that is Case 1, 2, or 3 happen.
25
Lemma 2 Suppose that $t=\tau_{i}=\tau_{j}$ happens on $(x^{20}, y^{20})$ where we dene
$(x^{20}, y^{20})=(x_{ij}^{20}, y_{ij}^{20})\cup(x_{i}^{20}, y_{i}^{20})\cup(x_{j}^{20}, y_{j}^{20})$ . (13)
Then security values issued by rm $i$ and $j$ are given as
$p_{i}^{s}(x^{20}, y^{20})=0, p_{i}^{d}(x^{20}, y^{20})= \frac{(1-\delta_{i})x^{20}+\pi_{ij}^{d}(1-\delta_{j})y^{20}}{1-\pi_{ij}^{d}\pi_{ji}^{d}}$ (14)
$p_{j}^{s}(x^{20}, y^{20})=0, p_{j}^{d}(x^{20}, y^{20})= \frac{(1-\delta_{j})y^{20}+\pi_{ji}^{d}(1-\delta_{i})x^{20}}{1-\pi_{ji}^{d}\pi_{ij}^{d}}$ . (15)
Proof From Assumption 1, the values of securities issued by rm $i$ and $j$ must satisfy
followings:
$p_{i}^{d}(x^{20}, y^{20})=(1-\delta_{i})x^{20}+\pi_{ij}^{s}p_{j}^{s}(x^{20}, y^{20})+\pi_{ij}^{d}p_{j}^{d}(x^{20}, y^{20})$ , (16)
$p_{j}^{d}(x^{20}, y^{20})=(1-\delta_{j})y^{20}+\pi_{ji}^{s}p_{i}^{s}(x^{20}, y^{20})+\pi p_{i}^{d}(x^{20}, y^{20})$ . (17)
It follows that debt values can be given by solving the system of equation (16) and (17). $\square$
Note that Suzuki (2002) showed the payo functions under Merton $(1976)$ 's model with
cross-holdings of debts and equities. Lemma 2 can be recognized as a slight extension of Suzuki
(2002) with positive default costs.
Second we show the method to derive the security values when non-simultaneous default
happens. Suppose Case 4. So suppose $t=\tau_{i}<\tau_{j}$ happens on $(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})$ . Since rm $j$ liquidate
rm $i$ 's debt and invest the cash into a riskless consol bond with a coupon $r\pi_{ji}^{d}p_{i}^{d}(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})$ from
Assumption 2, the value of securities issued by rm $i$ and $j$ must satisfy the following equation:
$p_{i}^{d}(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})=(1-\delta_{i})x_{i}^{21}+\pi_{ij}^{s}p_{j}^{s}(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})+\pi_{ij}^{d}p_{j}^{d}(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})$ , (18)
$p_{i}^{s}(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})=0$ , (19)
$p_{j}^{s}(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})=q_{j}^{s}(y_{i}^{21};r\pi p_{i}^{d}(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21}$ (20)
$p_{j}^{d}(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})=q_{j}^{d}(y_{i}^{21};r\pi_{ji}^{d}p_{i}^{d}(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21}$ (21)
Here we are interested in the value $p_{i}^{d}(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})$ for a given $(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})$ . So we can nd that
$p_{i}^{d}(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})$ is given as a root of implicit function
$p_{i}^{d}(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})=(1-\delta_{i})x_{j}^{21}+\pi_{ij}^{s}q_{j}^{s}(y_{i}^{21}, r\pi_{ji}^{d}p_{i}^{d}(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21}))+\pi_{ij}^{d}q_{j}^{d}(y_{i}^{21}, r\pi_{ji}^{d}p_{i}^{d}(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21}$ (22)
Finally we can show that the non-linear equation (22) with respect to $p_{i}^{d}(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})$ has a unique
solution. We state the results including Case 5 due to the symmetry of $i$ and $j.$
Proposition 1 The debt value $w_{i}=p_{i}^{d}(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})$ and $w_{j}=p_{j}^{d}(x_{j}^{21}, y_{j}^{21})$ are given by a xed point
of the functions dened respectively by
$f(w_{i})=(1-\delta_{i})x_{i}^{21}+\pi_{ij}^{s}q_{j}^{s}(y_{i}^{21};r\pi_{ji}^{d}w_{i})+\pi_{ij}^{d}q_{j}^{d}(y_{i}^{21};r\pi_{ji}^{d}w_{i})$ (23)
$f(w_{j})=(1-\delta_{i})y_{i}^{21}+\pi_{ji}^{s}q_{i}^{s}(x_{j}^{21};r\pi_{ij}^{d}w_{j})+\pi_{ji}^{d}q_{\iota'}^{d}(x_{j}^{21};r\pi_{ij}^{d}w_{j})$ . (24)
And rm $j$ 's optimal default boundary after rm $i$ 's default is given by
$b_{j}(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})= \frac{\gamma_{j}}{\gamma_{j}-1}(\frac{c_{j}}{r}-\pi_{ji}^{d}w_{t}$ . (25)
Also nn $i$ 's optimal default boundary aft er rm $j$ 's default is given by
$b_{i}(x_{j}^{21}, y_{j}^{21})= \frac{\gamma_{l}'}{\gamma_{i}-1}(\frac{c_{i}}{r}-\pi_{ij}^{d}w_{j})$ . (26)
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Corollary 1 If default cannot happen before bond maturity as in Merton (1976), we can show
that the debt values at maturity date are not unique if we suppose the default cost on a rm's
assets (See Appendix). However if default can happen before the maturity so as to maximize
rms' equity values as in Leland (1996), the debt values at default are unique even though with
a positive default cost.
3 Analysis on Optimal Default Boundaries
We will present analytical implicit solutions for optimal default boundaries under cross-holding
of debts and equities between two rms. We also derive debt values on the boundaries. We
follow the approach developed by Adkins and Paxon (2011) that solves an optimal replacement
decision under a two-factor model.
3.1 Cross-holdings of Debts and Equities
Since the security values $p_{i}^{s}(Z_{i}, Z_{j})$ , $p_{j}^{s}(Z_{i}, Z_{j})$ are time-independent, their innitesimal generator
$\mathcal{A}$ is given as follows
$\mathcal{A} = \frac{1}{2}\sigma_{i}^{2}Z_{i}^{2}\frac{\partial^{2}}{\partial Z_{i}^{2}}+\frac{1}{2}\sigma_{j}^{2}Z_{j}^{2}\frac{\partial^{2}}{\partial Z_{j}^{2}}+\rho\sigma_{i}\sigma_{j}Z_{l}$
$+ \mu_{i}Z_{i}\frac{\partial}{\partial Z_{i}}+\mu_{j}Z_{j}\frac{\partial}{\partial Z_{j}}-r.$
The cash ow of equity issued by rm $i$ is given in (11). We can also obtain the cash ow of
equity issued by rm $j$ by replacing $j$ with $i$ in (11). It follows that values of equities issued by
rms $i$ and $j$ must satisfy the following partial dierential equations:
$\mathcal{A}p_{i}^{s}(Z_{i}, Z_{j})+(r-\mu_{i})Z_{l}\prime-c_{i}+\pi_{ij}^{s}((r-\mu j)Z_{j}-c_{j})+\pi_{ij}^{d}c_{j}=0$ , (27)
$\mathcal{A}p_{j}^{s}(Z_{i}, Z_{j})+(r-\mu_{j})Z_{j}-c_{j}+\pi_{ji}^{s}((r-\mu_{i})Z_{i}-c_{i})+\pi_{ji}^{d}c_{i}=0$ . (28)
The homogeneous part of the generic function of each security is given by the from $A_{k}Z_{\iota'}^{\beta_{k}}Z_{j}^{\eta_{k}}$
$(k=i, j)$ where $A_{k}$ is an undetermined coecient. Moreover, $\beta_{k}$ and $\eta_{k}$ are given by roots of
the following characteristic equation:
$Q( \beta, \eta)=\frac{1}{2}\sigma_{i}^{2}\beta(\beta-1)+\frac{1}{2}\sigma_{j}^{2}\eta(\eta-1)+\rho\sigma_{i}\sigma_{j}\beta\eta+\mu_{i}\beta+\mu_{j}\eta-r=0$ . (29)
Details about such analysis can be seen in Adkins and Paxon (2011).
Since the equity holder doesn't have any option except the option to default, the homogeneous
part of each security takes a single term. It follows that the values of securities take forms as
follows:
$p_{i}^{s}(Z_{i}, Z_{j})=A_{i}Z_{i}^{\beta_{i}}Z_{j}^{\eta_{i}}+Z_{i}- \frac{c_{i}}{r}+\pi_{ij}^{s}(Z_{j}-\frac{c_{j}}{r})+\pi_{ij}^{d}\frac{c_{j}}{r}$ , (30)
$p_{J}^{s} \prime(Z_{i}, Z_{j})=A_{j}Z_{i}^{\beta_{j}}Z_{j}^{\eta_{j}}+Z_{j}-\frac{c_{j}}{r}+\pi_{ji}^{s}(Z_{i}-\frac{c_{i}}{r})+\pi_{ji}^{d}\frac{c_{i}}{r}$ , (31)
We assumed that rms cannot have any other options except the option to default. Then
it is natural to suppose $\beta_{i},$ $\beta_{j},$ $\eta_{i},$ $\eta_{j}\leq$ O. Note also that these 4 coecients are not necessarily
constants. Let us examine this point in more detail.
First, suppose $(Z_{i}, Z_{j})$ hit the boundary
$(x_{i}, y_{i})=(x_{i}^{20}, y_{i}^{20})\cup(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})$ .
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Now $(x_{i}, y_{i})$ are given by the rm $i$ 's maximization of their equity value. Then the necessary
conditions for the optimal default boundaries $(x_{i}, y_{i})$ are smooth-pasting conditions:
$\frac{\partial p_{i}^{s}}{\partial Z_{i}}(x_{i}, y_{i}) = \beta_{i}A_{i}x_{i}^{\beta_{i}-1}y_{i}^{\eta_{i}}+1=0$ , (32)
$\frac{\partial p_{l}^{s}}{\partial Z_{j}}(x_{i}, y_{i}) = \eta_{i}A_{i}x_{i}^{\beta_{i}}y_{i}^{\eta_{i}-1}+\pi_{ij}^{s}=0$ , (33)
The corresponding value-matching condition comes from (19), so the equation
$p_{i}^{s}(x_{i}, y_{i})=A_{i}x_{i}^{\beta_{i}}y_{i}^{\eta_{i}}+x_{i}- \frac{c_{i}}{r}+\pi_{ij}^{s}(y_{i}-\frac{c_{i}}{r})+\pi_{ij}^{d}\frac{c_{j}}{r}=0$ (34)
must be satised.
Here we have ve unknowns: $A_{i},$ $\beta_{i},$ $\eta_{i},$ $x_{i},$ $y_{i}$ but the model consists of four equations: (29),
(32), (33) and (34). Since our aim is to determine the default boundary $(x_{i}, y_{i})$ , we will derive
the boundary by the function of $y_{i}$ . Then four equations: (29), (32), (33) and (34) can be seen
as a system of equation with respect to $(A_{i}, \beta_{i}, \eta_{i}, x_{i})$ . Here it is useful to derive the relation
between $x_{i}$ and $y_{i}$ . So we have
$x_{i}= \frac{\beta_{i}}{\beta_{i}-1}(\frac{c_{\eta}}{r}-\pi_{ij}^{s}(y_{i}-\frac{c_{j}}{r})-\pi_{ij}^{d}\frac{c_{j}}{r})$ (35)
from (32) and (34).
Remark 3 We can see that the default threshold (35) has the same component with (9). How-
ever the values of $\beta_{i}$ and $\eta_{i}$ depends on $y_{i}$ . This is dierent from (9) with constant $\gamma_{k}$ in that
rms hold a riskless consol bond.
Proposition 2 Under the non-arbitrage condition $\mu_{i}<r$ and $\mu_{j}<r$ , the system of non-linear
equations (29), (32), (33) and (34) has the unique solutions $\beta_{i}<0,$ $\eta_{i}<0,$ $x_{i}>0$ and $A_{i}>0$
for a given $y_{i}>0.$
Second, suppose $(Z_{i}, Z_{j})$ hit the boundary
$(x_{j}, y_{j})=(x_{j}^{20}, y_{j}^{20})\cup(x_{j}^{21}, y_{j}^{21})$ .
This is a symmetrical case to the boundary $(x_{i}, y_{i})$ . Therefore it is easy to derive the same
relations. However we state all of that because we need corresponding equations to study the
simultaneous default. So the smooth-pasting condition and value-matching condition are given
as follows:
$\frac{\partial p_{j}^{s}}{\partial Z_{i}}(x_{j}, y_{j}) = \beta_{j}A_{j}x_{j}^{\beta_{j}-1}y_{j}^{\eta_{j}}+\pi_{ji}^{s}=0$ , (36)
$\frac{\partial p_{j}^{s}}{\partial Z_{j}}(x_{j}, y_{j}) = \eta_{j}A_{j}x_{j}^{\beta_{j}}y_{j}^{\eta_{j}-1}+1=0$ , (37)
$p_{j}^{s}(x_{j}, y_{j})=A_{j}x_{j}^{\beta_{j}}y_{j}^{\eta_{j}}+y_{j}- \frac{c_{j}}{r}+\pi_{ji}^{S}(x_{j}-\frac{c_{i}}{r})+\pi_{ji}^{d}\frac{c_{i}}{r}=0$ . (38)
From (37) and (38), we have
$y_{j}= \frac{\eta_{j}}{\eta_{j}-1}(\frac{c_{j}}{r}-\pi_{j_{l}}^{s}(x_{j}-\frac{c_{\eta}}{r})-\pi_{ji}^{d}\frac{c_{i}}{r})$ (39)
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Note that from the similarity of rm $i$ and $j$ and Proposition 2, we can nd the set of values
$\beta_{j}<0,$ $\eta_{j}<0,$ $y_{j}>0$ and $A_{j}>0$ for a given $x_{j}.$
Third, suppose again $(Z_{i}, Z_{j})$ hit the boundary $(x_{i}, y_{i})$ before hitting $(x_{j}, y_{j})$ . We assumed
that rm $j$ chooses to be solvent on $(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})$ while rm $j$ chooses default on $(x_{i}^{20}, y_{i}^{20})$ . Since
$(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})$ and $(x_{i}^{20}, y_{i}^{20})$ are on the same line represented by (35) which is continuous function
with respect to $(x_{i}, y_{i})$ , there can exists a threshold value $y_{i}^{*}$ which divides $y_{i}^{21}$ and $y_{i}^{20}$ . We can
specify $(x_{i}^{20}, y_{i}^{20})$ and $(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})$ by Proposition 2 and the following result.
Proposition 3 The optimal default boundaries for Case 2 and Case 4 can be given by
$(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})=\{(x_{i}, y_{i})|y_{i}>y_{i}^{*}\}$ , (40)
$(x_{i}^{20}, y_{i}^{20})=\{(x_{i}, y_{i})|y_{i}\leq y_{i}^{*}\}$ , (41)
where $x_{i}$ is given by Proposition 2 for given $y_{i}$ and where
$y_{i}^{*}= \frac{\gamma_{j}\{\pi_{ji}^{d}(1-\delta_{i})\frac{\beta_{i}}{\beta_{i}-1}\frac{c_{i}}{r}-(1+\pi_{ji}^{d}\pi_{ij}^{d}(1-\delta_{i})\frac{\beta_{i}}{\beta_{i}-1})\frac{c_{j}}{r}\}}{1-\gamma_{j}\{1-\pi_{ji}^{d}(\pi_{ij}^{s}(1-\delta_{i})\frac{\beta_{i}}{\beta_{i}-1}-\pi_{ij}^{d}(1-\delta_{j}))\}}$ . (42)
Note that the optimal default boundaries for Case 3 and Case 5 are given in the Appendix.
Fourth, suppose $(Zl\prime, Z_{j})$ hit the boundary $(x_{ij,\iota"}^{20}y_{J}^{20})$ before hitting $(x_{i}, y_{i})$ and $(x_{j}, y_{j})$ . Then,
the rm $i$ maximizes their equity value, so (35) is satised. Further the rm $j$ maximizes their
equity value, so (39) is satised. Therefore the optimal boundary for Case 1 is given by a crossing
point of (35) and (i39) as follows.
Proposition 4 The optimal boundary for Case 1 is given by
$x_{ij}^{20} = - \beta_{i}\{\frac{c_{i}}{r}(1-\eta+j\pi_{ij}^{s}(\pi_{ji}^{s}-\pi_{ji}^{d}))+\frac{c_{j}}{r}(\pi_{ij}^{s}-(1-\eta_{j})\pi_{ij}^{d})\}/\Gamma$ , (43)
$y_{ij}^{20} = - \eta_{j}\{\frac{c_{i}}{r}(\pi_{ji}^{s}-(1-\beta_{i})\pi_{ji}^{d})+\frac{c_{j}}{r}(1-\beta_{i}+\beta_{i}\pi_{ji}^{s}(\pi_{ij}^{s}-\pi_{ij}^{d}))\}/\Gamma$ , (44)
where
$\Gamma=(\beta_{i}-1)(\eta_{j}-1)-\beta_{i}\eta_{j}\pi_{ji}^{s}\pi_{ij}^{s}$
and where $(\beta_{i}<0, \eta_{i}<0)$ are the root of the system of equations (29), (33), (32) and (34) and
where $(\beta_{j}<0, \eta_{j}<0)$ are the root of the system of equations (29), (36), (37) and (38).
Theorem 1 If $\delta_{i}>0$ then $y_{i}^{*}>y_{ij}^{20}$ . Then $(x_{l}^{20}\prime, y_{i}^{20})\neq\phi$ . It follows that $\mathbb{P}(\tau_{i}=\tau_{j})>0.$
Remark 4 For given default boundaries, we can get the debts values by the Lemma 2 and
Proposition 1
3.2 Cross Holdings of Debts Only
As a special case, we suppose $\pi_{ij}^{s}=\pi_{ji}^{s}=$ O. Then $\eta_{i}=0$ from (33). It follows that $\beta_{i}=\gamma_{i}$
by substituting $\eta_{i}=0$ to (29). Also, since $\beta_{j}=0$ from (36), $\eta_{j}=\gamma_{j}$ . Finally, we can derive a
closed form expression of the optimal default boundaries for the case of cross-holdings of debts
only, not equities, as follows:
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Theorem 2 If $\pi_{ij}^{s}=\pi_{jl}^{s}=0$ then the optimal default boundaries for Case 2 and Case 4 are
given by
$(x_{i}^{21}, y_{i}^{21})=\{(x_{i}, y_{i})|y_{i}>y_{i}^{*}\}$ , (45)
$(x_{i}^{20}, y_{i}^{20})=\{(x_{i}, y_{i})|y_{\'{i}}\leq y_{i}^{*}\}$ , (46)
where
$x_{i}= \frac{\gamma_{i}}{\gamma_{i}-1}(\frac{c_{i}}{r}-\pi_{ij}^{d}\frac{c_{j}}{r}) , y_{\'{i}}\geq 0$ (47)
and where
$y_{i}^{*}= \frac{\gamma_{j}\{\pi_{ji}^{d}(1-\delta_{i})\frac{\gamma_{i}}{\gamma_{i}-1}\frac{c_{i}}{r}-(1+\pi_{ji}^{d}\pi_{ij}^{d}(1-\delta_{i})\frac{\gamma_{i}}{\gamma_{i}-1})\frac{c_{j}}{r}\}}{1-\gamma_{j}\{1+\pi_{ji}^{d}\pi_{ij}^{d}(1-\delta_{j})\}}$ . (48)
Also, the optimal default boundaries for Case 3 and Case 5 are given by
$(x_{j}^{21}, y_{j}^{21})=\{(x_{j}, y_{j})|x_{j}>x_{j}^{*}\}$ , (49)
$(x_{j}^{20}, y_{j}^{20})=\{(x_{j}, y_{j})|x_{j}\leq x_{J}^{*}$ (50)
where
$x_{j} \geq 0, y_{j}=\frac{\gamma_{j}}{\gamma_{j}-1}(\frac{c_{j}}{r}-\pi_{ji}^{d}\frac{c_{i}}{r})$ . (51)
and where
$x_{j}^{*}= \frac{\gamma_{i}\{\pi_{ij}^{d}(1-\delta_{j})\frac{\gamma_{j}}{\gamma_{j}-1}\frac{c_{j}}{r}\pi_{ij}^{d}\pi\frac{\gamma_{j}}{\gamma_{j}-1})\frac{c_{i}}{r}\}}{1-\gamma_{i}\{d}$ . (52)
Furthermore, the optimal default boundaries for Case 1 is given by a point:
$(x_{ij}^{20}, y_{ij}^{20})=(x_{i}, y_{j})$ . (53)
4 Conclusion
We study the optimal default boundaries when rms establish cross-holdings of debts and equi-
ties and when rms can chooses the time of default so as to maximize their equity values. We
showed the optimal default boundaries with cross-holdings of debts and equities can be given by
the unique solution of a system of equations. We also showed that the optimal default bound-
aries with cross-holdings of debts only, not equities, are given by closed form expressions. In
addition to these, we showed that simultaneous defaults can happen with positive probability
even though we suppose that rms' reference assets follow geometric Brownian motions. We
also showed that rms' payouts cannot be unique when default can happen only at the bond's
maturity with positive default costs. In contrast to this, we showed that rms' payouts on
default can be unique even though with a positive default cost when rms choose the time of
default so as maximize their equity values.
Appendix
The optimal default boundaries for Case 3 and Case 5
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It can be given by
$(x_{j}^{21}, y_{j}^{21})=\{(x_{j}, y_{j})|x_{j}>x_{j}^{*}\}$ , (54)
$(x_{j}^{20}, y_{j}^{20})=\{(x_{j}, y_{j})|x_{j}\leq x_{j}^{*}\}$ , (55)
where
$x_{j}^{*}= \frac{\gamma_{i}\{\pi\frac{\eta_{j}}{\eta_{j}-1}\frac{c_{j}}{r}\pi_{ij}^{d}\pi\frac{\eta_{j}}{\eta_{J}'-1})\frac{c_{\iota'}}{r}\}}{1\pi_{ij}^{d}(\pi_{j}^{s}\frac{\eta_{j}}{\eta_{j}-}-\delta_{i}))\}}$ . (56)
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